WHAT EXPLAINS THE INCREASED UTILIZATION
OF POWDER RIVER BASIN COAL IN ELECTRIC
POWER GENERATION?
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This article examines possible explanations for increased utilization of Powder River Basin (PRB) coal
in electric power generation that occurred over the last two decades. Did more stringent environmental
policy motivate electric power plants to switch to less polluting fuels? Or, did greater use of PRB coal
occur because relative price changes altered input markets in favor of this fuel. A key ﬁnding is
that factors other than environmental policy such as the decline in railroad freight rates together
with elastic demand by power plants were major contributors to the increased utilization of this
fuel.
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Since the inception of the Clean Air Act in
1970, SO2 emissions in the United States de
clined by 50% at less than 10% of the originally
estimated cost (Kerr 1998). Much of this re
duction appears to have occurred through sub
stitution at electric utilities from high-sulfur
coal to cleaner-burning inputs of low-sulfur
coal from the Powder River Basin (PRB) of
Wyoming and Montana. Over the twelve-year
period 1990–2002, PRB coal production more
than doubled and the number of utilities burn
ing this fuel more than tripled, while coal pro
duction in the high-sulfur Illinois Basin (Illi
nois, Indiana, and West Kentucky) declined
by 42%. Identifying the relative importance of
factors that can explain these stylized facts is
essential to understanding the role of environ
mental policy to control SO2 emissions.
This article weighs several possible expla
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tion of low-sulfur PRB coal to generate elec
tric power. One explanation for increased PRB
coal use, emphasized by the U.S. Department
of Energy (2000), is that more stringent envi
ronmental policy motivated electric utilities to
switch to less polluting fuels. The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 lowered SO2 emissions
limits for the dirtiest power plants and allowed
for expanded compliance options through the
landmark introduction of marketable emis
sions permits. An alternative explanation is
that greater use of PRB coal may have oc
curred because of relative price changes that
were unrelated to innovations in environmen
tal policy. The period 1985–2000 witnessed sub
stantial declines in the mine-mouth price of
PRB coal, railroad freight rates, and rail trans
portation costs. These factors potentially in
duced existing buyers to increase their use of
this fuel and attracted new buyers through an
expansion of railroad service territories.
The analysis is framed around a model of
railroad behavior for two reasons.1 First, trans
portation is a signiﬁcant source of value-added
in the market for delivered, low-sulfur coal.
PRB coal is shipped almost entirely by rail
and transportation costs run as high as 80%
of delivered prices. Second, the small num
ber of railroads that deliver PRB coal suggests
1
Numerous recent studies (see, e.g., Joskow, Schmalensee, and
Bailey 1998; Montero 1999; and Carlson et al. 2000) have exam
ined performance of federal environmental policy by looking at
the market for emission permits. For a detailed discussion of the
political economy of allocating emission permits, see Joskow and
Schmalensee (1998).

a potential for market power that can com
promise the effectiveness of environmental
policy.2
It turns out that the extent of railroad market
power is crucial to sorting out the importance
of the various factors that led to increased uti
lization of PRB coal. Consider, for instance,
the effectiveness of SO2 emission controls in
stimulating input substitution favoring low sul
fur fuels at electric utilities. If the railroad
sector is competitive, SO2 emission controls
bid up delivered PRB coal prices, encourag
ing deliveries of PRB coal to more distant
utilities, while leaving deliveries to existing
buyers unchanged. If the railroad sector is
noncompetitive, SO2 policy similarly expands
the geographic market for PRB coal; however,
because demand facing railroads is more elas
tic at greater shipping distances, the entry of
new utilities in the service region alters the
ability of railroads to spatially price discrim
inate. Shipments to existing buyers, as a con
sequence, are reduced.
The model of railroad behavior is tested us
ing unique data on 353 PRB coal shipment
routes for the period 1988–1999. Two key ﬁnd
ings emerge from the empirical analysis. First,
the geographic market area for PRB coal ex
panded largely because of declines in rail trans
portation costs and the mine-mouth price of
PRB coal, and to a lesser extent because of
more stringent environmental policy including
the introduction of SO2 emission permits. Sec
ond, the demand for PRB coal is price elastic,
so the decline in delivered prices that occurred
over this period provided incentives for power
plant operators to substitute toward the use of
PRB coal throughout the railroad service ter
ritory. Controlling for shipping distance, the
empirical results show that electric generat
ing plants with Table A units—the units sin
gled out in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 for immediate SO2 emission reduction—
paid no higher freight rates and bought no
more PRB coal than plants without Table A
units. These results, differ from recent ﬁnd
ings of Busse and Keohane (2007) who ﬁnd
an important role for environmental policy in

2
More generally, the analysis also contributes to the literature
on market performance in the transportation sector and provides
a rare glimpse into how market power is exercised over space.
Market performance has been examined in the airline industry
(see, e.g., Borenstein 1989, 1990; Brander and Zhang 1990; Kim
and Singal 1993) and in the trucking industry (Savage 1995). The
potential to exercise market power in rail transportation has been
recognized since at least the case of Standard Oil (see Granitz and
Klein 1996).

shaping coal market outcomes, but nonethe
less are broadly consistent with: (1) Ellerman
and Montero (1998) and Ellerman et al. (2000)
who found that environmental policy was not
an important contributor to increased utiliza
tion of PRB coal in electric power genera
tion and (2) Greenstone (2002), who argues
that environmental policy was not a major fac
tor leading to the observed decline in SO2
emissions.
Background
The model developed in the following section
has three types of agents (mines, railroads, and
electric utilities) and two types of markets (a
market between mines and railroads and a se
ries of spatially distributed markets between
railroads and individual utilities). Key aspects
of the model are: (1) mines are perfect com
petitors, (2) railroads potentially exercise mar
ket power in the determination of freight rates,
and (3) utilities have no bargaining power.
These aspects differ in several respects from
the way industry structure has been conceived
in earlier studies, and the purpose of this sec
tion is to reconcile these views.
In the 1980s, leading studies of the PRB
coal market suggested at least four poten
tially important sources of noncompetitive be
havior among mines, railroads, and utilities.
First, Atkinson and Kerkvliet (1986) argued
that mines may have market power because of
entry barriers that arise from restrictions on
federal coal leasing, from the long lead times
required to construct mines and to obtain oper
ating permits, and from the large capital invest
ments required to minimize average extraction
cost. Second, mines in the PRB, both then and
today, produce heterogeneous coal with im
portant differences in BTU and in levels of im
purities such as sulfur, sodium, and ash. Power
engineers in the early 1980s widely believed
that, because particular generating units only
could accommodate coal with narrowly de
ﬁned characteristics, the heterogeneity of PRB
coal deposits limited substitution possibilities
between suppliers. This provided an incentive
for both mines and utilities to enter into longterm contracts to protect relationship-speciﬁc
investments (Joskow 1987). Third, railroads
may have market power because few railroads
serve PRB mines and alternative modes of coal
transportation out of the PRB either are not
cost-effective (e.g., trucking) or else do not
exist (e.g., barges and coal slurry pipelines).

Fourth, as Kolstad and Wolak (1983) observe,
state governments may exert market power
by competing strategically for resource rents
through severance taxes on production.
Since these early studies, new information
has come to light to suggest that much has
changed in the coal market. Barriers to entry
eased substantially following the procoal deci
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sierra Club v.
Kleppe in 1976 and the end of the moratorium
on federal coal leasing in the 1980s. Between
1984 and 2002, the number of operating mines
remained constant (twenty mines), while aver
age annual production per mine grew from 6.1
million tons to 18.75 million tons, which sug
gests that mines today exploit economies of
scale to a greater extent than they did in earlier
years. Average production costs for PRB coal
declined sharply over this period as a result
of capital investment in excavation equipment
such as conveyors, earth-moving vehicles, and
draglines together with advances in computer
ization and control equipment (Darmstadter
1999). A production-weighted average of engi
neering estimates of mine-speciﬁc real variable
costs per ton declined by 57% between 1985
and 2000 ($4.68/ton vs. $2.01/ton). Indeed,
even in nominal terms, the average extraction
costs for PRB coal declined by nearly 40%
(BXG, Inc. 1985a; Hill and Associates, Inc.
2000).3 Accordingly, the average real minemouth price of PRB coal fell by 64% (from
$13.97/ton vs. $5.38/ton) (U.S. Department of
Energy, Energy Information Administration
various years) over the period.
The decline in coal production costs and
mine-mouth prices in the PRB, mirrors a na
tionwide trend in coal markets. For instance,
in the Illinois Basin, an important high-sulfur
coal region, a production-weighted average
of engineering estimates of mine-speciﬁc real
variable costs per ton fell by about the same
percentage as in the PRB between 1985 and
2002 (54%; $32.09/ton vs. $14.62/ton) (BXG,
Inc. 1985b; Hill and Associates, Inc. 2003) and
real mine-mouth prices declined by about 26%
from $37.36/ton to $21.43/ton over the pe
riod 1985–2000 (U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration various
years).
PRB coals now are generally viewed as
good, though not perfect, substitutes with each
other and with eastern coals in the generation
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All real values in this article are expressed in year 2000 dollars
and are obtained using the GDP deﬂator.

of electric power for two reasons. First, power
plants generally have different types of gener
ating units engineered to burn different fuels
and can use each unit more or less intensively
as relative fuel prices and government regula
tions change. Second, coals obtained from dif
ferent PRB mines are now commonly mixed
with each other in an increasingly diversiﬁed
fuel portfolio and, coincident with the passage
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
blending of PRB coal with eastern coals began
in the early 1990s.4 In 1999, for example, 73%
of plants that bought PRB coal did so from
more than one mine, and, at each plant, the
PRB coal purchased was sourced (on average)
from 2.75 mines.
Partly as a result of the increased po
tential for fuel mixing, long-term contracts
(e.g., twenty years) diminished in importance
throughout the 1990s.5 Today, spot market pur
chases combined with sales under shorter-term
contracts of four years or less represent the
industry norm. Current PRB coal contracts
almost uniformly contain market based re
opener provisions in place of price escalation
or take-or-pay requirements, and this increases
the exposure of both mines and utilities to mar
ket forces.
Evidence from the last twenty years also
suggests a limited scope for strategic behav
ior by state governments in the PRB. Over the
period 1980–2000, Wyoming coal production
more than tripled from 94 million tons to 340
million tons, while Montana coal production
increased only slightly from 30 million tons to
38 million tons (U.S. Department of Energy,
Energy Information Administration 2003). At
least three factors appear to explain the dif
fering fortunes of the coal industry in the two
states: (1) largely because of lower in situ ratios
(bank cubic yards of overburden moved per
ton of recoverable coal), coal production costs
have remained substantially lower in Wyoming
4
Perhaps 25% of coal-ﬁred generating units now burn a blend
of PRB and eastern coal. Nevertheless, to blend these two types of
coal requires a signiﬁcant capital cost and certain technical barri
ers must be overcome. PRB coal, which is subject to spontaneous
combustion, has roughly 70% of the BTU content per pound as
compared with Illinois Basin coal. This means that as more PRB
coal is added to the blend, a greater total volume of coal is needed
to generate a ﬁxed amount of energy, more ash must be disposed
of, and more maintenance must be performed on coal handling
and generating equipment. A separate storage area for PRB coal
also is needed along with additional space and equipment to mix
it with other coals. Because of the large capital cost that would
be incurred, completely switching a generating unit’s fuel source
between types of coal remains uncommon.
5
The expiration of long-term contracts and the concomitant shift
to spot sales and short-term sales agreements represents another
reason for the decline in PRB coal prices mentioned previously.

than in Montana;6 (2) Wyoming coal is gen
erally of higher quality and contains fewer
impurities than Montana coals;7 and (3) the
transportation infrastructure out of Wyoming
is better developed than its counterpart out
of Montana, a feature undoubtedly related to
the differences noted above in the extraction
cost and quality of deposits. For these rea
sons, strategic behavior among state govern
ments is suppressed and the empirical analysis
in the article focuses on Wyoming PRB coal
production.
Prior evidence also suggests that railroads
exert market power. Wolak and Kolstad (1988)
examine market power in the Western U.S.
coal market and conclude that railroads haul
ing coal, and in particular railroads haul
ing coal out of Wyoming, exercise market
power. Among railroads serving Wyoming,
two lines—Burlington Northern Santa Fe
(BNSF) and Union Paciﬁc (UP)—currently
initiate all transportation of PRB coal.8 These
railroads generally employ trains of 100 cars or
more to haul coal from Wyoming mines to ei
ther individual electric power plants or termi
nals, and the rail cars, which do not simultane
ously carry other commodities, subsequently
return empty to the mines.
Model
The model extends the framework of Greenhut and Ohta (1972) to consider spatial mar
ket power in a duopoly railroad sector with
an endogenously determined service region.
Each railroad purchases low-sulfur coal at spot
prices from a competitive mining industry in
the PRB and delivers it to a series of spatially
distributed, but otherwise identical electricity
generating units (utilities). The railroads de
liver only a single product—PRB coal—and
select freight schedules over distance as well
as a terminal point that deﬁnes the geographic
extent of the market. Attention is limited to
cases in which economies of scope do not exist
6
In 2000, a production-weighted average of engineering esti
mates of mine-speciﬁc variable costs per ton was 67% higher in
Montana than in Wyoming, a percentage cost difference approxi
mately identical to that which prevailed in 1985 (BXG 1985a; Hill
and Associates 2000).
7
For example, among the so-called “super-compliance” coals
(those with very low SO2 per million BTU), the high sodium con
tent of Montana deposits limits their marketability.
8
The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, which entered the
Wyoming coal transportation market in the early 1980s, no longer
serves the PRB. Also, the BNSF and UP do not always complete de
liveries to all power plants because coal is frequently transshipped
via other lines.

in the transportation cost function. The reason
is that deliveries of PRB coal are sufﬁciently
large that each delivery involves a separate trip
between a PRB mine and a utility.
The spatial dimension of the market is de
scribed by railroad shipments between mineutility pairs, where a mine-utility pair is
measured as the distance between a utility and
its source mine for PRB coal. To focus atten
tion on railroad behavior, the source mines for
PRB coal are consolidated at a single point in
space (the origin) and utility location is mea
sured continuously in terms of distance from
the origin along a rail line of unit length.9 The
maximum distance shipped by the railroads,
N ∗ ∈ (0, 1), deﬁnes the service region for lowsulfur coal, and the remaining utilities, those
located on the segment 1-N ∗ , burn high-sulfur
coal.
Individual electric generating units (“boil
ers”) are assumed to be identical across utili
ties, so that the agglomeration of boiler units
into power plants at various points in space is
subsumed into the spatial distribution of util
ities. Because the freight rate on any route is
independent of the freight rate on any other
route, moreover, it is not necessary to spec
ify the distribution of utilities along the rail
line, except when considering the total quan
tity of coal delivered. For illustrative purposes,
the effect of SO2 policy on aggregate PRB coal
shipments is computed under the assumption
of a uniform distribution of utilities, although
the results readily generalize to the case of any
known distribution.
Utility Demand for PRB Coal
The fuel portfolio available to utilities is com
prised of low-sulfur PRB coal and high-sulfur
coal. All sources of high-sulfur coal are as
sumed to have identical sulfur content, and
the sources are sufﬁciently numerous that the
delivered price of high-sulfur coal is invari
ant over space.10 By conﬁning attention to
only two sources of fuel, the model focuses
on the empirical regularity of expanding PRB
coal markets into high-sulfur coal regions in
the Midwest, while suppressing the possibil
ity that utilities may choose to burn fuels
9
Greenhut and Ohta (1972) consider a discrete (and exogenous)
number of consumers evenly distributed along a line. The speciﬁ
cation here of a continuous distribution facilitates the calculation
of an endogenous service region.
10
In the predominant region of interest—the Midwest—power
plants generally have several nearby alternatives for high-sulfur
coal.

other than coal, such as natural gas, or avoid
fuel-switching altogether by installing postcombustion abatement equipment (“scrub
bers”).11 Switching from high-sulfur coal to
low-sulfur coal is an attractive compliance op
tion for many utilities, and to highlight this
choice, low-sulfur coal is treated as a pollutionfree alternative to high-sulfur coal.
The electricity market is assumed to be com
petitive and the boiler units used by utilities are
homogeneous in all respects apart from their
location in space. Let pe denote the electric
ity price, and let pl (x) and ph denote, respec
tively, the delivered prices of PRB coal and
high-sulfur coal to a utility at distance x.
Utilities are arrayed spatially along the rail
line and face different freight rates, and hence
different delivered prices, for PRB coal. To see
the implication of this for fuel-switching be
havior, suppose p(x) rises smoothly from zero
over distance. Rising prices over distance di
vide utilities into three possible categories: (i)
for plants sufﬁciently close to the PRB source
mines, delivered prices of PRB coal are low
enough relative to the high-sulfur coal price
that only PRB coal is used; (ii) for plants at
an intermediate range of distances, delivered
prices of PRB coal are such that fuel mixing be
tween PRB coal and high-sulfur coal occurs;
and (iii) for sufﬁciently long distances, deliv
ered prices of PRB coal are high enough that
utilities buy only high-sulfur coal.
The goal of the model is to examine the ef
fects of changes in environmental policy, trans
portation cost (t) and the mine price (w) on
the quantity of low-sulfur sold coal in the mar
ket and on the maximum distance it is shipped.
These outcomes are largely determined by rail
road pricing behavior on the extensive margin
where fuel switching occurs. To clarify these ef
fects, the remainder of this section treats highand low-sulfur PRB coal as perfect substitutes
in the generation of electricity. While this is
a strong assumption, it has the advantage of
creating a clear separation between the inten
sive margin and the extensive margin of rail
road service by suppressing the intermediate
region where fuel mixing occurs. It also fa
cilitates the interpretation of the econometric
estimates presented in the next section. Impli
cations of relaxing the perfectly substitutable
fuels assumption are noted later on.
The problem facing a utility at distance x is
to select the quantity of PRB coal, ql (x), and
11

Fuel-switching has proven to be a considerably more effec
tive method of emissions control than postcombustion abatement
technology. See Carlson et al. (2000).

high-sulfur coal, qh (x), to maximize proﬁts sub
ject to environmental policy on SO2 emissions.
Let  denote the SO2 emissions coefﬁcient for
high-sulfur coal, so that SO2 emissions for a
utility at distance x can be deﬁned as e(x) =
qh (x). Each utility is given an initial endow
ment of SO2 allowances and must purchase an
SO2 allowance for each unit of emissions above
this level at a price of .
The market price of an SO2 allowance () is
taken as given by each ﬁrm, but is determined
endogenously by the cap on total emissions in
the market. Total SO2 emissions are given by
1
E =  0 qh (x) d x, and the sum of all SO2 al
lowances must meet the regulated level of E
under the emissions cap.
A utility with an initial endowment of e0 al
lowances maximizes proﬁts of
 u (x) = pe f (q(x) + qh (x)) − p(x)ql (x)
− ph qh (x) + (e0 − e(x))
subject to nonnegativity constraints on the use
of low-sulfur coal, ql (x) ≥ 0 and high-sulfur
coal qh (x) ≥ 0, and the relationship between
high-sulfur coal use and SO2 emissions, e(x) =
qh (x).
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a
maximum are
(1)

l ≡ pe f � (.) − pl (x) ≤ 0

l ql (x) = 0

(2)
h ≡ pe f � (.) − ph −  ≤ 0,

h qh (x) = 0

where f � (.) denotes the marginal product of
coal in electricity production. Let ps = ph +
 denote the effective price of high-sulfur fuel
(inclusive of the permit requirement). Notice
that the effective price of high-sulfur coal is in
dependent of distance; hence the choice of a
utility to burn PRB coal or high-sulfur coal de
pends only on the relative prices, pl (x) and ps .
By inspection of expressions (1) and (2), the
conditional (inverse) demand for low-sulfur
coal is given by p(x) for p(x) ≤ ps and zero
otherwise.
The Rail Sector
In the upstream market, the spot price per unit
of coal at the mine mouth is w.12 In the trans
portation sector, the marginal cost of hauling
12
Note that this formulation sets aside issues of scarcity and in
creasing “user cost.” Low-sulfur PRB coal is in abundant supply
and, as noted in the previous section, mine-mouth prices have
trended downward over time.

one unit of coal an additional unit of distance
is t.13 Accordingly, the total cost of delivering
the quantity, ql (x), to a utility at distance x,
is txql (x), and the total cost of procuring and
N
hauling coal is c(Q) = 0 (w + t x)ql (x) d x,
where N is the extensive margin of service.
Fixed costs, which are necessary to justify
the existence of railroad market power, play
no role in the analysis and are consequently
omitted.
The railroad’s problem is to select the num
ber of utilities to serve, N ∗ , and a delivered
quantity for each utility in the service region
x ∈ [0, N ∗ ]. The freight charge per unit of coal
delivered to a utility at distance x is deﬁned as
the difference between the delivered price and
the mine price, f (x) = p(ql (x)) − w.
Railroads hauling low-sulfur coal compete
in a homogeneous product transportation mar
ket subject to capacity constraints on the
available rail cars. Because this capacity must
be allocated across all routes, the outcome
for PRB freight prices can range from com
petitive to monopolistic (i.e., railroad collu
sion), depending on the intensity of compe
tition between the railroads along individual
routes. Busse and Keohane (2007) describe
this outcome as a series of bargaining prob
lems between a monopoly railroad and utili
ties over freight rates, an approach that is con
ceptually equivalent to introducing distancespeciﬁc conduct parameters to describe the de
parture from marginal cost pricing along each
route. Their approach is to examine whether
the Table A designation of electric plants leads
to systematic differences in the bargaining
outcome, whereas the approach taken here
is to characterize the spatial market equilib
rium under railroad competition and railroad
monopoly, respectively, with regard to minemouth prices, transportation costs, and the in
troduction of SO2 policy.
Under competition with constant unit trans
portation costs, the freight schedule, f c (x) = tx,
rises linearly from zero at a rate of t over dis
tance to maintain the delivered PRB coal price
equal to marginal transportation cost, p(x) =
w + tx. The competitive service region for PRB
coal terminates at distance N ∗ when the deliv
ered price rises to ps = w + tN ∗ .
Under monopoly, demand is assumed to
be downward sloping, differentiable, and to
satisfy

(3)

p � (ql (x)) + ql (x) p �� (ql (x)) < 0.

Equation (3), which always holds for linear
and concave demand, is related to the stan
dard existence condition under oligopoly (see,
e.g., Novshek 1985). Its role is to guarantee that
marginal revenue declines faster than price as
the delivered quantity increases, which implies
that demand is more elastic at higher prices.
The transversality condition derived below re
quires demand to be inﬁnitely elastic at the ex
tensive margin of service, and this occurs nat
urally over distance by condition (3) as trans
portation costs (and delivered prices) rise.
The optimal freight schedule potentially has
two distinct spatial regions, which are referred
to as region I and region II. In region I,
utilities purchase a sufﬁciently large quantity
of PRB coal that interior monopoly prices
obtain, p(ql (x)) < ps . In region II, utilities
are sufﬁciently distant that the unconstrained
monopoly price exceeds the price of highsulfur coal. The railroads may continue to serve
utilities in this region, but can do so only under
the binding constraint that p(ql (x)) = ps . This
implicitly deﬁnes a unique quantity delivered
to each region II utility, denoted hereafter by
ql s .
Let n denote the number of region I utilities
served, and m = N − n denote the number of
region II utilities served. The total quantity of
coal shipped by the railroads is

(4)

n

Q l (x) =
0

ql (x) d x + mqls

and railroad proﬁt, accordingly, is


n

(w, t, ps ) =
0

( p(ql (x)) − t x − w)ql (x) d x



N

+
n

( ps − t x − w)qls d x.

The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for
a maximum proﬁt are given by the Euler
equation,
(5)

p(ql (x)) + ql (x) p � (ql (x)) − t x − w = 0,
for x ∈ [0, n]

the region I boundary condition,
(6)

p(ql (n)) = ps

13

This assumption of constant marginal cost per ton-mile is cor
roborated by empirical analysis later on.

and the transversality condition,

(7)

( ps − t N − w)qls = 0

where the substitution p(ql (N)) = ps has been
made in equation (7).14 Equations (5)–(7) have
a straightforward interpretation. Equation (5)
is the condition for optimal spatial pricing in
region I. This is the standard monopoly pricing
condition that marginal revenue be set equal
to delivered marginal cost (w + tx) for PRB
coal deliveries to the utility at distance x. Equa
tion (6) deﬁnes the point in distance (x = n∗ )
where the monopoly price of delivered PRB
coal equates with the price of the alternative
fuel, which describes the region I boundary.
At distance n∗ , the unconstrained monopoly
price rises to ps and further price increases are
not feasible; however, proﬁt is still positive for
shipments at this distance. Equation (7) deﬁnes
the extensive region of railroad service (the re
gion II boundary). Deliveries continue to the
distance N ∗ , where ps equates with marginal
transportation cost and proﬁt is zero.
Let q∗l (x, t, w), n∗ (t, w, ps ), and N ∗ (t, w, ps )
denote the solutions to (5)–(7). The railroad
freight rate schedule is

region II.15 Notice that the number of utilities
served, N ∗ , which is determined by the zero
proﬁt condition (7) at the extensive margin
of service, is independent of railroad market
structure. Nevertheless, because freight rates
are lower throughout the service territory un
der competition (and identical only for the util
ity at distance N ∗ ), a competitive railroad in
dustry delivers a greater total quantity of PRB
coal.
Let (x) = f(x)/x denote the freight rate per
ton-mile. In a competitive railroad sector, the
freight rate per ton mile is constant, c (x) = t.
Under monopoly, the freight rate per ton mile
decreases over distance, because of the abil
ity of railroads to spatially price discriminate.
Unit delivery cost rises at a constant rate of t
per unit of distance, but the margin between
delivered price and unit cost falls as demand
becomes increasingly elastic at more distant
utilities. Market power declines over distance
for a monopoly railroad in both service regions.
Testable Predictions

Two types of predictions can be derived from
the model: (i) comparative static effects of
(8)
changes in mine-mouth PRB prices, w, and
f ∗ (x, t, w, ps )
railroad transportations costs, t, on the railroad

  ∗
p ql (x, t, w) − w for x ≤ n ∗ (t, w, ps ) service region and, on freight rates, and (ii) the
effect of changes in SO2 policy. These predic
=
for x > n ∗ (t, w, ps ). tions are presented in turn below and are then
ps − w
empirically tested in the following section.
The freight rate schedule (8) rises over dis
Equation (7) indicates that the extent of the
∗
tance in region I until the distance n (t, w, ps ) railroad service region, N ∗ , does not depend on
is reached, beyond which point freight rates market structure. Therefore, cost innovations
remain constant over distance in region II un that reduce either w or t have an expansionary
til the terminal distance where the freight rate effect on the market area for PRB coal that is
equates with transit cost, ps − w = tN ∗ (t, w, ps ). independent of the degree of railroad market
Thus, in region II the relative price of high- power.
sulfur coal (gross of permits) to the delivered
Within the service territory for PRB coal,
price of PRB coal must equate to unity.
the freight rate under competition, f c (x) = tx,
The freight rate schedules under competi does not respond to changes in w, and a small
tion and monopoly are depicted in ﬁgure 1 decrease in transportation costs of dt units de
for the case of linear demand. Notice that a creases the freight rate per ton by x dt units.
competitive railroad industry does not have a Under monopoly, a one-unit reduction in w
region II portion of the freight rate schedule, reduces the delivered price to each utility in
whereas a monopoly (and oligopoly) railroad region I and extends the region I boundary
does. The monopoly freight rate schedule (i.e., n∗ increases in ﬁgure 1). Freight rates rise
is piecewise concave, exhibiting a positive by less than one unit to utilities in region I,
markup at the origin (x = 0), rising at a more whereas freight rates rise by exactly one unit
gradual rate than under competition through to utilities in region II. A decline in trans
out region I (e.g., at rate t/2 when demand portation costs lowers freight rates to region
is linear), and then equating with ps − w in
14

The Legendre condition associated with proﬁt maximization
holds strictly by condition (3).

15
In the case where low- and high-sulfur coal are imperfect substi
tutes and fuel mixing occurs along the entire rail line, the monopoly
freight schedule is smoothly concave.

Figure 1. Freight rate per ton schedules over distance under com
petition and oligopoly

Figure 2. Total quantity of PRB coal delivered under monopoly
freight pricing
I utilities and expands the region I boundary.
A transportation cost decrease of dt units de
creases monopoly freight rates by less than x dt
units in region I, but has no effect on freight
rates in region II because demand for PRB coal
at these plants is perfectly elastic (see ﬁgure 1).
A tradable allowance system for SO2 emis
sions introduces a market price to reﬂect the
SO2 content of high-sulfur coal. The require
ment that utilities purchase SO2 allowances
to offset their emissions increases the effec
tive price of high-sulfur coal from ph to ps =
ph +  (see equation (2)). The SO2 allowance
price () that emerges in the permit market
is determined by the magnitude of the man
dated reduction in SO2 emissions—the size of
the “cap”—and by the market demand for al
lowances. Given the spatial distribution of util

ities burning PRB coal and high-sulfur coal,
market demand for SO2 allowances is deﬁned
by aggregate demand for coal at electric plants
located at distances (1 − N ∗ ) along the rail
line. Policies that limit the aggregate quantity
of SO2 emissions alter both the extensive mar
gin of service for PRB coal and the quantity of
high-sulfur coal burned at each utility outside
the service region for PRB coal.16
The effect of SO2 regulation on the spa
tial distribution of PRB coal deliveries is de
picted in ﬁgure 2. Figure 2 shows the delivered

16
An alternative to fuel substitution among utilities burning highsulfur coal is to meet the emissions cap by changing the emissions
coefﬁcient (), for instance by installing postcombustion abate
ment technology. These effects are suppressed for the reasons dis
cussed earlier.

quantity schedule over distance for the case
of linear utility demand for coal. Prior to en
vironmental regulation, the delivered quantity
schedule declines over distance at rate –t/2p� in
region I (see equation (5)), and then remains
constant thereafter at qs0 in region II. Region I
extends outward from the source mines to the
distance n∗0 and the length N ∗0 − n∗0 deﬁnes the
extent of region II. The total delivered quan
tity of PRB coal is the area under the quan
tity schedule q0 (x∗ ). The total quantity of highsulfur coal burned by electric utilities sums the
quantity of coal demanded by utilities located
at distances 1- N ∗0 . Because each plant out
side the PRB service territory burns qs0 units
of coal, the total quantity of high-sulfur coal
used by all plants is (1 − N ∗0 )qs0 , which is rep
resented in the ﬁgure by the area N ∗0 ab1. Prior
to SO2 regulation, total emissions are E∗0 =
(1 − N ∗0 )qs0 .
After cap-and-trade regulation, total SO2
emissions decrease to the regulated level, E∗1 =
(1 − N ∗1 )qs1 < E∗0 . The decrease in industry
SO2 emissions occurs through a combination
of input price effects that reduce the use of
high-sulfur coal by utilities, qs1 < qs0 , and fuel
substitution effects from high-sulfur coal to
PRB coal among utilities on the extensive mar
gin of service, N ∗1 > N ∗0 . For an arbitrary emis
sions cap of E1 units, the total amount of highsulfur coal used in the regulated industry is rep
resented in ﬁgure 2 by the shaded region, area
N ∗1 cd1, for the case of SO2 regulation that lim
its the total quantity of high-sulfur coal burned
at electric utilities to (1 − N ∗1 )qs1 . Utilities lo
cated at distances between N ∗0 and N ∗1 comply
with the regulation by substituting away from
high-sulfur coal to PRB coal and selling their
SO2 allowances to utilities located at greater
distances from the source mines for PRB coal.
The outward expansion of the service region
for PRB coal drives up the delivered price of
PRB coal (see equation (7)), and the expansion
of the PRB service territory continues to dis
tance N ∗1 where the zero proﬁt condition on the
extensive margin of the railroad service region
clears individual input demand for the remain
ing 1 – N ∗1 utilities at the quantity (qs1 ) neces
sary to clear the emissions market at E∗1 units.17
For a binding emissions cap, the equilibrium al
lowance price solves equation (7): ∗ = (tN∗1 +
w − ph )/.
17
Formally, under an emissions cap of E∗1 units the extensive mar
gin of PRB service must satisfy N 1 = 1 – E∗1 / q1 , which can be
used together with equations (6) and (7) to recover qs1 and N ∗1 = 1
– E∗1 / qs1 .

The permit price that emerges in the SO2
allowance market is independent of market
structure in the PRB transportation sector.
The reason is that the permit price is driven by
fuel switching behavior at the extensive mar
gin of railroad service (region II) and utility
demand for PRB coal is perfectly elastic for
these utilities. The quantity of high-sulfur coal
purchased by each utility located in the region
1 – N ∗1 must clear the individual input demand
at a level (qs1 ) that exactly allocates aggregate
SO2 emissions to meet the cap, and the effec
tive price of high-sulfur coal, ps , must rise to
clear the demand at this quantity.18
Within the service territory for PRB coal,
SO2 policy has no effect on freight rates for
incumbent region I utilities. Under railroad
competition, freight rates for delivery of PRB
coal are not altered for existing subscribers
and the service territory for PRB coal expands
until transportation costs rise to equate the
delivered price of PRB coal with the permitinclusive price of high-sulfur coal at N ∗1 . Util
ities switching away from high-sulfur coal and
to PRB coal as a result of SO2 regulation
(i.e., utilities located at distances between N ∗0
and N ∗1 ) pay higher freight rates than incum
bent PRB subscribers, although the competi
tive freight rate per ton mile (t) remains con
stant for all utilities. Under railroad monopoly,
freight rates remain constant for incumbent re
gion I utilities following SO2 regulation, but
freight rates rise for both incumbent and en
trant utilities in region II. Utilities located at
distances between N ∗0 and N ∗1 that enter the
PRB service territory in response to SO2 reg
ulation pay the same delivered price for PRB
coal as incumbent region II utilities located at
distances between n∗1 and N ∗0 .
Empirical Analysis
This section describes the data used in the em
pirical analysis, presents econometric results,
and uses these results to test various implica
tions of the model.

18
Differences in SO2 allowance prices would emerge under var
ious railroad market structures due to indirect effects of the pol
icy on consumer energy prices that are suppressed in the present
model by treating energy prices as constant in equations (1) and
(2). With downward-sloping energy demand, SO2 policy reduces
the total amount of coal combusted by electric utilities, which in
creases consumer energy prices and shifts the derived demand for
coal outward at each utility, and the level effect of the shift in coal
input demand at the quantity level qs1 would be capitalized into
SO2 allowance prices.

Data
Data on railroad costs and freight rates are
taken from the 1988–1999 Carload Waybill
Samples of the U.S. Department of Transporta
tion, Surface Transportation Board (STB).
These data are not generally available, but
are provided when ofﬁcially requested for a
state-oriented research project by that state’s
government. Data consist of a sample of rail
road shipments either originating, terminating,
or passing through Wyoming. For each year,
the data were ﬁltered to eliminate all non-coal
shipments, and coal shipments of fewer than
ﬁfty cars, where the latter ﬁlter was applied to
eliminate intermittent coal shipments (i.e., for
test burns). Each year, the ﬁltered data rep
resent between 35 and 45% of total Wyoming
coal shipments.
The ﬁltered data on individual coal ship
ments were aggregated to yield 1229 obser
vations on annual coal shipments by route
(i.e., from one of sixteen railheads to one
of eighty-seven power plants) for the period
1988–1999.19 The data form an unbalanced
panel, as deliveries of PRB coal were made
to an increasing number of power plants over
time. For example, there are ﬁfty-ﬁve routes
with at least one shipment in the 1988 sample
and 150 routes with at least one shipment in
the 1999 sample. In the entire sample, there are
353 routes along which deliveries were made.
The main data elements for each route in each
year consist of total variable costs, total freight
revenue, total tonnage of sampled shipments,
and route length (in railroad miles).
While the Carload Waybill Sample data con
tain detailed measures of railroad costs and
freight rates that are otherwise unavailable,
they are not without limitations. Variable costs
are not measured directly, but rather are im
puted using national relationships for forty
class I railroads for each year. Also, exact
freight revenue data are conﬁdential and ap
proximate (sometimes overstated) values are
reported for some shipments (for further de
tails, see Association of American Railroads
2000).
Available data for real variable transporta
tion cost per ton-mile and real freight rates
19
Aggregation of individual shipments is necessary to comply
with STB disclosure rules. These rules require data to be aggre
gated to the level of at least three shippers to prevent the identiﬁ
cation of individual railroads (Code of Federal Regulations 2001).
As indicated previously, two railroads initiated all shipments of
Wyoming PRB coal, but because of transshipments to other lines,
a total of sixteen railroads were involved delivering coal to power
plants along the sample routes.

per ton-mile indicate that both variables de
cline over time. Over the sample period, real
variable cost declined by 36% from an average
of 11.47 mills per ton-mile across all routes in
1988 to 7.34 mills per ton-mile across all routes
in 1999 and real freight rates per ton-mile de
clined by 36% from an average of 19.65 mills
per ton-mile across all routes in 1988 to an aver
age of 12.58 mills per ton-mile across all routes
in 1999. Under difference between means tests,
the declines in both variables are statistically
signiﬁcant at 1%.
Further analysis of the cost data suggests
that marginal transportation cost per ton-mile
is roughly constant with respect to both tons
and distance, a result that is established by
regressing the natural logarithm of total real
railroad variable cost on the natural logarithm
of ton-miles with ﬁxed effects for each of the
353 routes and for each of the eleven years
(n = 1,229). The estimated elasticity of total
variable cost with respect to ton-miles is 0.986
(s.e. = 0.003). Thus, marginal cost per ton-mile
is approximately equal to average variable
cost per ton-mile and both marginal cost and
average cost are constant over tonnage and
distance, a plausible outcome because trains
hauling coal from the PRB do not carry other
commodities that would require stops at mul
tiple delivery points.
Table 1 shows the behavior of real freight
rates per ton-mile by computing Lerner indices
over routes of different length. Lerner indices
for each route in each year were obtained by
expressing the difference between the freight
rate per ton-mile and marginal (= average)
cost per ton-mile as a percentage of the freight
rate per ton-mile. Values in table 1, obtained
by averaging within each of three distance cat
egories, show that the Lerner indices decline
signiﬁcantly (at 1%) with distance, suggesting
that railroads exercise market power.20 While
not shown in Table 1, Lerner indices also de
clined across all routes by an average of 15%
between 1988 and 1999. Deregulation of rail
roads (see Ellerman and Montero 1998 and
Ellerman et al. 2000) may have played a role
here, but the decline in price of high sulfur coal
also may have been an important factor (see
below).
In the econometric analysis, the Carload
Waybill Sample data were supplemented
with information taken from Form 423 of
20
A separate analysis of real freight rates per ton-mile also
shows that this variable declines signiﬁcantly at the 1% level over
distance.

Table 1. Lerner Indices for Three Distance Intervals
Power Plant
Location is:
Lerner Index
Mean
Standard error
N
Difference between means
t-statistic

Less than 550
Miles from
PRB (1)

Between 550
Miles and 1,100 Miles
from PRB (2)

More than 1,100
Miles from
PRB (3)

0.553
0.007
127
(1)–(2)
21.04

0.372
0.005
536
(1)–(3)
25.38

0.329
0.006
573
(2)–(3)
5.51

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). This form records the quantity of coal
received by a power plant on each shipment
(not just sampled shipments), the delivered
price, the name of the mine from which the
coal was shipped, whether the shipment rep
resented a contract or spot sale, and selected
characteristics of the coal shipped including
BTU, sulfur, and ash content. These data were
aggregated and then matched by route and
year to 1229 observations obtained from the
Carload Waybill Sample.
Econometric Analysis
Implications of the theoretical model are
tested by estimating a three equation simul
taneous equation model to explain marginal
transportation cost per ton-mile, freight rates
per ton-mile, and quantity of coal shipped
along each route in each year. Transportation
costs and freight rates are measured in real
terms. Estimation is by 3 SLS with a full set
of ﬁxed effects for routes and years. Whereas
the model assumed that routes differ only in
length, econometric estimates control for het
erogeneity among mines and power plants as
well as over time. Control for route-speciﬁc
effects is achieved by expressing all variables
in all equations as differences from their time
means. Time-speciﬁc effects are accounted for
by including dummy variables for the years
1989–1999 in each equation.
The three equations are further speciﬁed as
follows. First, the equation for marginal trans
portation cost per ton-mile (t) is linear with
covariates measuring two institutional factors
(railcar ownership and number of interline
transfers) discussed more fully below as results
of estimation are described. Because marginal
cost per ton-mile was found to be approxi
mately constant over distance, the freight rate
was not entered as an explanatory variable in

this equation.21 Quantity of coal shipped was
not entered as a covariate either because PRB
coal usually is transported in units of about 100
rail cars and the number of trips from the mines
to a plant should not affect marginal trans
port cost on any given trip. Route-speciﬁc ef
fects were included because marginal cost per
ton-mile, while approximately constant over
distance for each route, differs across routes.
Time-speciﬁc effects control for factors such as
railroad productivity improvements, changes
in fuel costs, and the gradual switch from steel
railcars to lighter-weight aluminum railcars.
Second, the freight rate equation is based on
the assumption of linear power plant demand
for PRB coal and makes use of equation (8).
This equation indicates that if railroads exer
cise monopoly power, the optimal freight rate
per ton (f ∗ ) is positive at the origin, increases
with distance (x) at rate t/2 in region I and then,
beginning at (x = n∗ ) is equal to difference be
tween the substitute fuel price and the minemouth PRB coal price (w) throughout region
II (see ﬁgure 1). On the other hand, if railroads
behave competitively, the freight rate per ton
is zero at the origin and then increases with
distance at the rate of t throughout the entire
service territory. Thus, equation (8) suggests
estimating a spline function (see Greene 2003,
pp. 121–122):
(9)

∗
f jT
= 0 jT + 1 t jT x j


+ 2 d jT t jT x j − n ∗jT + u jT .

In equation (9), j indexes routes, T indexes
years, djt = 1 if xj ≥ n∗jt , djt = 0 if xj < n∗jt ,
and u is an error term with zero mean and
21
In an alternative speciﬁcation of the model, the freight rate
was tried as a covariate in the marginal cost equation, however,
its coefﬁcient did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at conventional
levels.

a conveniently speciﬁed variance that is as
sumed to be proportional to the square of
distance along a given route. Heterogeneity
across routes is expected because of: (1) dif
ferences in mine-mouth PRB coal price (due
to differences in heat and impurity content) of
coals loaded at PRB railheads and (2) differ
ences in the price of high-sulfur coal and other
fuels to electric power plants. Heterogeneity
over time arises because of trends in coal prices
affecting all Wyoming PRB mines (e.g., due to
factors identiﬁed previously that led to declin
ing mining costs), changes in environmental
policy affecting coal users, prices of SO2 emis
sion permits, and trends in prices of fuels such
as high-sulfur coal, oil and natural gas that im
pact fuel choices by electric power plants. In
consequence, equation (9) uses ﬁxed effects to
allow for differences in the intercept as well as
in the boundary between region I and region II
over both routes and time.22 The ﬁxed effects
allow for correlation between the purely routeand time-varying innovations and the included
covariates (x), but not with the error term (u).
The slope coefﬁcient estimates from equation
(9) are interpreted as conditional on the ﬁxed
effects (see Greene 2003 for details). Restric
tions on equation (9) implied by the model are
that: (1) under competition, 0jT = 2 = 0, and
1 = 1 for all routes and years and (2) under
railroad monopoly power, when PRB coal and
high-sulfur coal are perfect substitutes, 1 =
1/2 = −2 and 0jT > 0 for all routes and years.
Because data on PRB mine-mouth coal
prices (w jt ) by mine and over time are unavail
able, a useful approach to estimation is to sub
stitute for n∗jt and then rewrite equation (9) (see
footnote #22) as
(10)

f j∗T = 0 jT + 1 t jT x j + 2 d jT t jT x j + u jT

where if 1 = 1/2 = −2 , then  0jT = [wjT +
(a/b)jT ]/2 if djT = 0 and  0jT = psjT if djT =
1. The equation to be estimated then is ob
tained by dividing through by xj to express the
dependent variable as the freight rate per tonmile, to remove heteroskedasticity in ujT , and
to include the effect of distance (a pure routespeciﬁc effect) in the intercepts.  ojT is ap
proximated by a set of route- and time-speciﬁc
22
If, except for length, routes are homogeneous, then linear
power plant demand for PRB coal (q = a − bp) together with
monopoly power by proﬁt-maximizing railroads implies that n∗ =
[2ps − w − (a/b)]/t. Allowing for heterogeneity over routes and
time in alternative fuel prices, in PRB mine-mouth coal prices,
and in power plant demand parameter suggest that the boundary
between region I and region II will vary over routes and time as
well.

constants. Three covariates were added to
complete the speciﬁcation: (1) a dummy vari
able to indicate whether the coal was trans
ported to a power plant with Table A units, (2)
the total annual quantity of coal purchased by
the power plant (in tons per mile), and (3) a
dummy variable to indicate whether the coal
shipped was a spot sale.
A difﬁcult aspect of estimating equation
(10), however, is to specify djt so that it ap
propriately classiﬁes routes either as region
I routes or as region II routes. As indicated
above, it is problematic to obtain reliable es
timates of n∗jt and it is not fruitful to attempt
to classify region I and region II routes in each
year on a priori grounds. Instead, the approach
taken is to assume that values of n∗jt do not dif
fer widely either across routes or over time, so
that one value of n∗ can classify routes accord
ing to whether they serve region I or region II
utilities.23 If this assumption is workable and
the model correctly describes behavior, then it
should be possible to ﬁnd a value of n∗ such
that the estimate of 1 ≈ −2 ≈ 1/2.
Third, in the demand equation for PRB coal
by destination power plants, the quantity of
coal was expressed as a linear function of the
freight rate per ton-mile, the generation ca
pacity of the destination plant, and a dummy
variable for whether the destination plant had
Table A units. Quantity of coal purchased is
measured in tons per mile to maintain con
sistency with the freight rate equation. Be
cause the freight rate is measured in ton-miles,
this speciﬁcation imposes an “identical power
plant” restriction in that changes in freight
rates per ton have the same effect on tons
of PRB coal demanded for all power plants
regardless of their distance from the mines.
Route-effects were included to account for dif
ferences in characteristics of power plants and
in route length. Time-effects were included to
account for changes in the prices of substitute
fuels and changes in environmental policy that
occurred through passage of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990.
Table 2 presents sample means of all covari
ates (see column (1)) and coefﬁcient estimates
in the equations for marginal transportation
cost per ton-mile (see column (2)), the freight
23
An unsuccessful attempt was made to check this speciﬁcation
after the fact that by using available data on average prices over
time for high-sulfur coal and PRB coal together with estimates
from the PRB coal demand equation (see footnote #22). Calcula
tions of the boundary between region I and region II turned out to
be quite sensitive to the estimates of the route-speciﬁc intercepts
in the PRB coal demand equation.

Table 2. Determinants of Marginal Cost, Freight Rates, and Coal Demand (NT = 1,229)
Explanatory
Variable
=1 if year is 1988;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1989;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1990;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1991;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1992;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1993;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1994;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1995;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1996;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1997;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1998;
0 otherwise
=1 if year is 1999;
0 otherwise
Real Marginal Cost per ton-mile
Real Marginal Cost × dummy variable
that equals one if distance to utility is
greater than 550 miles from mine;
zero otherwise
Fraction of spot sales
=1 if destination utility has Table A
generating units; 0 otherwise
Number of Interline Transfers
Fraction of railcars not owned by a
railroad
Real freight rate
Destination utility generation in
billions of KWH
Tons per mile of PRB coal
purchased

Sample
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
0.044
(0.205)
0.050
(0.219)
0.060
(0.238)
0.054
(0.226)
0.063
(0.242)
0.057
(0.231)
0.099
(0.299)
0.104
(0.306)
0.097
(0.296)
0.116
(0.321)
0.133
(0.339)
0.122
(0.328)
1.060
(3.207)
3.897
(4.697)
0.350
(0.454)
0.218
(0.413)
0.660
(0.856)
0.762
(0.340)
14.718
(5.451)
4.248
(0.248)
1342.10
(2088.09)

Real Marginal
Cost
Per Ton-Mile

Real Freight
Rate
Per Ton-Mile

Tons per Mile
of PRB Coal
Purchased
–b

b

––
−0.111
(0.231)
0.115
(0.229)
−0.753∗
(0.229)
−1.456∗
(0.226)
−1.327∗
(0.234)
−2.324∗
(0.213)
−2.543∗
(0.214)
−2.200∗
(0.224)
−2.230∗
(0.226)
−2.560∗
(0.226)
−3.110∗
(0.232)
––b
––b

––b
b

––

0.343∗
(0.086)
−2.156∗
(0.206)

b

––
−0.288
(0.396)
−0.671
(0.387)
−1.493∗
(0.396)
−2.024∗
(0.387)
−2.000∗
(0.404)
−2.289∗
(0.376)
−2.144∗
(0.381)
−2.453∗
(0.388)
−2.301∗
(0.385)
−2.824∗
(0.395)
−3.722∗
(0.419)
0.801∗
(0.141)
−0.750
(0.158)
0.568∗
(0.248)
−1.013
(0.889)

––b

––b
––b

––b
−492.20
(594.92)
––b

––b
––b
b

––
––b

b

––
––b

6.21
(262.10)
−96.97
(262.91)
−98.29
(282.43)
−654.96∗
(297.77)
−613.62∗
(308.96)
−1052.32∗
(308.92)
−1172.94∗
(314.22)
−1864.54∗
(381.65)
−2264.06∗
(423.09)
−2553.34∗
(471.26)
−3209.98∗
(562.48)

––b
−0.0002
(0.0003)

−345.59∗
(67.51)
3890.67∗
(594.92)
––b

Note: All monetary variables are in mills of year 2000 dollars, standard errors are in parenthesis below coefﬁcient estimates, the letter b denotes variables not
included in a regression, and an asterisk (∗ ) denotes a coefﬁcient that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.

rate per ton-mile (see column (3)), and tons
of coal shipped per mile (see column (4)).
In the estimated equation for marginal transportation costs per ton-mile, coefﬁcients of
time dummies reﬂect generally decreasing
marginal cost per ton-mile over the period
1988–1999, although costs do not decline by

the same amount each year.24 Controls for railcar ownership and the number of junctions
between rail lines are signiﬁcant determinants
24
For instance, these coefﬁcients show an abrupt decline in 1994.
This may be partly because the panel is unbalanced and the number
of routes in the sample increased by about 75% in that year.

of marginal cost. Rail car ownership measures
the percentage of railcars in the sampled coal
shipments that were not owned by the rail
road hauling coal.25 Use of these cars would
lower railroad costs, and, as shown in table 2,
this variable has a negative coefﬁcient (−2.16)
that is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the
1% level. Marginal cost per ton-mile increases
with the number of junctions (interline trans
fers between railroads) along a route and the
coefﬁcient of this variable is positive (0.34)
and signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1%
level. This outcome is consistent with results
presented by Tye (1990).
Five main results emerge from the estimates
of the real freight rate per ton-mile equa
tion. First, this equation allows for changes
in marginal transportation cost to affect the
freight rate differently depending on the extent
of market power in the railroad sector. Recall
that under competition, a one-unit change in
marginal transportation cost leads to an iden
tical one-unit change in the freight rate at all
points along the rail line. In contrast, under
railroad market power a one-unit change in
marginal transportation cost leads to a less
than one-unit change in the freight rate for
the plants in region I and a one-unit change
in marginal transportation costs has no effect
on freight rates to plants in region II. Esti
mates in column (3) show that the coefﬁcient
of marginal transportation costs is signiﬁcantly
greater than zero (at 1%) and that the in
teraction of marginal transportation cost and
the dummy variable indicating route distance
greater than 550 miles is negative and signif
icant (at 1%). The null hypothesis that these
two coefﬁcients add to zero is not rejected
at the 1% level, supporting: (1) the notion
that railroads have market power, (2) the di
vision point between region I and region II is
at approximately 550 miles with about 90% of
plants in region II, and (3) marginal transport
costs affect the freight rate within 550 miles
of the mines, but have no effect beyond that
point.26
Second, the equation permits a test of
whether freight rates differ between plants
with and without Table A generating units. The

25

These cars might be owned by another railroad or by a utility.
This result rests on a division of routes into two bins, routes less
than 550 miles (the shortest 10% of routes) and routes longer than
550 miles (the longest 90% of routes). In alternative speciﬁcations,
the mileage breakpoint deﬁning the bins was increased with the
result that the estimate of 1 (see equation (10)) declines, as would
be expected if region II plants are incorrectly classiﬁed as region I
plants. Dividing routes longer than 550 miles into more bins also
was tried and the results were little changed.
26

model predicts that freight rates will not dif
fer between such plants under both railroad
competition and monopoly. Under competi
tion, the freight rate always is equated with
marginal transportation cost, so that the des
ignation of Table A generating units makes
no difference for railroad freight rates. Under
monopoly, an increase in the cost of burning
high-sulfur coal leads to no change in freight
rates in region I. All region I plants burn lowsulfur coal and the railroad’s proﬁt maximizing
freight rate is simply a mark-up over marginal
transportation cost that does not depend on
the high-sulfur coal price. In region II, an in
crease in the cost of burning high-sulfur coal
increases freight rates to all buyers, both new
and incumbent, whether or not they operate
Table A units. Thus, plants with Table A units
do not see an increase in freight rates beyond
the rate charged to plants with no Table A
units. This prediction that freight rates to plants
with Table A units are the same as those to
plants without Table A units is borne out in the
estimates: The coefﬁcient of the dummy vari
able for plants with Table A generating units
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero at con
ventional levels.
Using a bargaining model, Busse and Keo
hane (2007) predict that after the initiation
of SO2 emissions trading: (1) delivered prices
of PRB coal will be higher at plants with
Table A units relative to plants with no Ta
ble A units and (2) delivered prices of PRB
coal increased by more at plants with Table
A units that are closer to mines than at sim
ilar plants located at a greater distance from
the mines. Because their econometric analysis
supports these predictions, these possibilities
were tested in expanded speciﬁcations of the
freight rate equation. When the speciﬁcation
of the freight rate equation is altered from that
shown in Table 2 by including interactions of
the Table A dummy variable with the dum
mies for years 1994–1999 (and other equations
speciﬁed as shown in table 2), the estimated co
efﬁcient of the interaction with year 1999 was
positive and differed signiﬁcantly from zero at
the 1% level. Coefﬁcients of other interactions
did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at conven
tional levels, so in this expanded speciﬁcation,
plants with Table A units did not see higher
freight rates beyond those charged to other
plants except in 1999. Also, starting from the
Table 2 speciﬁcation, when Table A dummy
in the freight rate equation was replaced with
interactions between it and two dummy vari
ables for whether a plant was less than 1,100
miles from the PRB mines and whether a plant

was more than 1,100 miles away, coefﬁcients of
the two interaction variables did not differ sig
niﬁcantly from zero.
Possible explanations for why these results
differ from those presented by Busse and Keo
hane (2007) are that the analysis in this arti
cle: (1) uses the STB data of railroad freight
rates rather than FERC 423 data on deliv
ered PRB coal prices and (2) controls un
observed heterogeneity between cross-section
units using route-effects, rather than by sep
arately entering mine-effects (origin-effects)
and plant-effects (destination-effects). For in
stance, in the present analysis, inclusion of 353
route-effects better controls for cross-section
heterogeneity than would the inclusion six
teen railhead-effects and eighty-seven powerplant effects because the route effects allow
the railhead- and power-plant effects to be
matched, thus completely removing the effect
of distance.
Third, spot sales tend to occur at lower
mine-mouth prices than coal sold under either
short- or long-term contracts. Under competi
tion, the freight rate is unaffected by a lower
mine-mouth price of PRB coal; whereas under
monopoly, a one-unit reduction in the minemouth price of PRB coal leads to a less than
one-unit increase in freight rates in region I and
exactly a one-unit reduction in freight rates in
region II. In column (3), the coefﬁcient of spot
market sales is positive and signiﬁcantly differ
ent from zero at the 1% level. This outcome
again supports the notion of market power in
the railroad sector as lower mine-mouth PRB
coal prices secured through spot sales result
in higher freight rates. Fourth, time dummies
are included to capture a number of unob
served factors (including those previously enu
merated such as SO2 permit prices) that vary
over time, but not across electric generating
plants. Coefﬁcient estimates of the time dum
mies indicate that on balance these factors led
to a signiﬁcant (at 1%) decline in freight rates
over the period 1988–1999. Implications of this
result are further developed in the next subsec
tion. Fifth, the quantity of coal purchased by
an electric generating plant is unimportant in
determining freight rates.
The third equation in the system estimates
the responsiveness of the quantity of PRB
coal demanded by power plants to changes in
freight rates. Because the quantity of coal pur
chased does not affect the freight rate, changes
in the observed freight rate (per ton mile) can
be used to trace out the demand curve. The de
pendent variable in this equation is expressed

as total annual tons of coal purchased per mile
of distance from the PRB mines.
Results presented in table 2, column (4) in
dicates that the previously described declines
in freight rates have a positive and signiﬁcant
(at 1%) effect on quantity of PRB coal pur
chased. The elasticity of quantity demanded
with respect to a change in the freight rate,
evaluated at sample means of these variables,
is −3.79. This estimate indicates that: (1) PRB
coal is a close substitute for other fuels used to
generate electric power (e.g., high-sulfur coal,
natural gas, and oil) whose prices are con
trolled with time dummies and (2) railroads
operate on the elastic portion of the demand
schedule for PRB coal, an outcome consistent
with railroad market power. Additionally, in
creases in electric generation capacity have a
positive and signiﬁcant (at 1%) effect on the
quantity of coal demanded. Coefﬁcients of the
time dummies reﬂect a downward trend in
the total quantity of PRB coal purchased
per mile of distance, possibly because aver
age route length increased over the sample
period and delivered quantity declines over
distance. The coefﬁcient of the dummy vari
able for electric generating plants with Table
A units, however is not signiﬁcant at conven
tional levels. This outcome is consistent with
the notion discussed previously that all plants
in region II face the same delivered price of
PRB coal whether or not they operate Table A
units.27
Discussion
Estimates from the econometric model and in
formation provided in the background section
can be used in conjunction with the model to
make some rough calculations that explain the
dramatic increase in utilization of PRB coal
in electric power generation in terms of: (1)
a market area effect and (2) a fuel substitu
tion effect. The market area effect refers to
the small geographic expansion of the rail
roads’ service territory for transporting PRB
27
The robustness of this result was checked in three ways. First,
the three equation system was reestimated with quantity of coal
speciﬁed in tons, rather than tons per mile. The coefﬁcient of the
Table A dummy did not differ signiﬁcantly from zero at 5%. Sec
ond, the system was reestimated after excluding from the sample
157 observations that involved electric generating plants that opted
in to phase I regulations. The opt-in plants were identiﬁed from a
complete list of such plants furnished by J.-P. Montero. Again, the
coefﬁcient of the Table A dummy did not differ signiﬁcantly from
zero at 5%. Third, interactions of the Table A dummy variable
with the time dummies also were tried as explanatory variables,
however, coefﬁcients of these interaction variables never were sig
niﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level or lower.

coal that occurred between the years 1988 and
1999. Over the period 1988–1997, the average
distance over which PRB coal was transported
increased from about 993 miles to 1,037 miles
(U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Informa
tion Administration 2000, p. 15) and over the
period 1988–1999, the length of the longest
route in the Carload Waybill sample grew from
1,575 miles to 1,673 miles. Four factors led
to this expansion. First, real railroad marginal
transportation costs declined 36% from an av
erage of 11.47 mills per ton-mile in 1988 to an
average of 7.34 mills per ton-mile in 1999. Sec
ond, the real mine-mouth price of PRB coal
declined 50% from $0.64 per million BTUs
in 1988 to $0.32 per million BTUs in 1999
(Hill and Associates 2000). Third, more strin
gent environmental regulation brought about
by the introduction of SO2 emission permits
raised the overall cost of burning high-sulfur
coal by about $0.15.28 Fourth and set against
the ﬁrst three factors, high sulfur coal prices
declined between the years 1988 and 1999.
Among utilities purchasing PRB coal identi
ﬁed in the Carload Waybill Sample, FERC 423
records indicate that the average real deliv
ered price of non-Wyoming coal, an estimate
of the high-sulfur coal price net of SO2 emis
sion permit costs, declined from $1.91 per mil
lion BTUs in 1988 to $1.27 per million BTUs
in 1999. Inclusive of SO2 permit costs, the esti
mated 1999 price of one million BTUs of nonWyoming coal was $1.42.
To more clearly illustrate how these fac
tors coalesce, consider the example of haul
ing one million BTUs of 8800 BTU/lb. PRB
coal hauled a distance of 1,600 miles in 1988.
As indicated previously, a route of this length
represents about the maximum distance that
PRB coal was transported during the late
1980s. Adding the railroad transportation cost
of making this delivery ($1.04 = $0.01742 ×
(1,000,000/8800) × 1600) to the mine-mouth
price of PRB coal ($0.64), yields $1.68, which
is lower than the price ($1.91) of non-Wyoming
coal prevailing at that time. Thus, railroads
appear to have had an incentive to haul coal
greater distances than 1,600 miles prior to the
enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990. This incentive increased throughout
the 1990s, and by 1999, the delivered cost of

28
This calculation assumes that: (1) nonWyoming coal averages
12,000 BTU/lb., (2) nonWyoming coal has 1.5 more pounds of SO2
per million BTUs than allowed under phase I compliance rules
(2.5 pounds of SO2 per million BTUs), and (3) the market price of
a permit to emit one ton of SO2 averaged $195 in 1999.

one million BTUs of PRB coal to a utility 1,600
miles distant had fallen by $0.64 in real terms to
$1.04 (the mine-mouth price of $0.32 plus rail
road transportation cost of $0.72). The deliv
ered price of high-sulfur coal (inclusive of SO2
emission permit costs) also fell over this pe
riod, but by a lesser amount ($0.49; from $1.91
to $1.42), and the price per million BTUs at
this distance fell by more for delivered PRB
coal than for high-sulfur coal even when no
accounting is made for the shadow cost of SO2
emission permits. In summary, it appears that
incentives already in place in the late 1980s, to
gether with price declines in the mine-mouth
price of PRB coal and declines in railroad
transportation cost, can explain much of the
small geographic expansion in the railroad ser
vice territory for PRB coal.
What other factors explain the rapid expan
sion of PRB coal utilization? The coefﬁcient
estimates of the time dummies in the table 2,
column (3) regression imply that, for a repre
sentative shipment of 8800 BTU/lb. PRB coal
to a utility 1,600 miles distant, the real freight
rate fell by approximately $0.34 per million
BTUs over the period 1988–1999, reducing the
delivered price per million BTUs of PRB coal
in real terms by $0.66 ($0.34 + $0.32). This
35% decline in price not only exceeded the
26% decline in the (permit-inclusive) real price
of high-sulfur coal; it also exceeded the real
price declines that occurred in both natural gas
(12%) and crude oil (15%) over the period.
Given the estimated price elasticity of demand
for PRB coal of –3.79, this change in relative
prices suggests that power plant operators sub
stituted heavily in the favor of PRB coal and
away from the use of other alternative fuels
for the generation of electric power through
out the market area. This substitution could
have occurred, for example, through utiliza
tion of coal mixtures tilted toward heavier use
of PRB coal and using PRB coal-ﬁred gener
ating units more intensively.
Summary and Conclusion
This article examines possible explanations
for the dramatically increased utilization of
PRB low-sulfur coal to generate electric power
that occurred during the late 1980s and 1990s.
Effects of environmental policy, costs, and
relative prices are examined using a threesector model of coal production, transporta
tion, and consumption that emphasizes the
role of railroads in hauling coal to spatially

distributed utilities. The relative importance of
each of the various explanations depends criti
cally on whether (and to what extent) railroads
exercise market power in setting freight rates
on low-sulfur coal.
Key ﬁndings from this study suggest that:
(1) railroads held market power over deliv
ered low-sulfur coal prices, (2) the geographic
market for PRB coal expanded mainly be
cause of substantial declines in both the real
mine-mouth price of PRB coal and the real
marginal cost of rail transportation, (3) the de
cline in both the mine-mouth price of PRB coal
together with the decline in railroad freight
rates induced power plant operators to sub
stitute PRB coal for high-sulfur coal as well as
for other fuels because demand for PRB coal
is price elastic. More stringent environmental
policy on SO2 emissions also appears to have
led to increased utilization of PRB coal, how
ever, the effect of policy is moderated by the
existence of railroad market power. These re
sults are broadly consistent with the view that
much of the increased utilization of PRB lowsulfur coal was due to the operation of market
forces rather than to changes in environmental
policy.
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